President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and the FARC have a special relationship, the nature of which is clear up to a certain point. Based on the success of the recently-suspended hostage release program, it’s practically certain that both sides have agreed on a long-term strategy that will reduce militarism and gradually decrease the net number of hostages in the FARC’s possession.
The FARC have an estimated 800 to 2800 hostages, depending on who is doing the estimation. Though the Colombian government would like us to believe there is a ratio of one hostage for every 3 or 4 rebels, the likelihood appears to be closer to 1:10. Whatever the true figure, these represent value to the FARC, and have traditionally been utilised either in swaps for rebels imprisoned by the Colombian state, or to extort ransom payments.
Alvaro Uribe’s Colombian government has no time for hostage/prisoner swaps, and aside from the FARC’s 40-odd “high value” hostages, the potential for monetary reward must dwarf in comparison to their gains from the cocaine trade. But since the arrival of the sympathetic Chavez government in neighbouring Venezuela, another possibility has arisen. The duo can now arrange unilateral hostage releases and simultaneously promote their general political cause (in the form of Chavez himself, who receives the hostages). The principal benefit, however, is that they can increasingly embarrass and undermine the hawks in the Colombian establishment.
Though there is a long way to go before Colombians vote for a resolute ally of Chavez, the aim is to split opinion between those who prefer never-ending militarism and those who prefer constructive dialogue. By demonstrating concrete results in the form of freed hostages, of which there will be many to come, it proves that dialogue is not only possible, but also desirable. By voluntarily releasing hostages, the FARC enhance their brand image, and by stepping down their militant efforts, Uribe’s “counterterrorism” prowess begins to lose its political value.
From the FARC’s perspective, a basic level of military resistance must be maintained, principally for self-defense, but also to demonstrate that the conflict will continue until Colombians elect a government which rejects the U.S. imperialist presence in Colombia, at the very least. Incidentally, the fact that overt militarism will hinder the new Chavez-FARC strategy is a strong indication that Chavez is not likely to be arming or funding them, as Colombia and the U.S. are eager to accuse.
So far we’ve had ample evidence that Uribe and the U.S. feel they must derail the new hostage release strategy at all costs: from mass anti-FARC/Chavez marches, to one documented attempt to sabotage a hostage release through surprise attacks, to the recent killing of FARC’s top hostage negotiator, and a campaign in the international media regarding Chavez’s alleged collaboration with the FARC’s military operations.
The hostage releases are a masterpiece in “asymmetric warfare” against the Colombian state and the U.S., because they involve zero violence and zero invasion of Colombian sovereignty. The overall strategy requires no funding of the FARC, and since it is entirely in their interests, it is highly unlikely they demand payment. In all probability, the freed hostages are to a large extent selected for their political damage quotient, based on what they are likely to say to the media, and especially with regard to any future political careers they might have.
Ingrid Betancourt is the hostage that everybody – including Chavez – most wishes to see released. Given her potential political future as a leftist Green who would represent an obvious choice for the poor majority in Colombia, the present government would undoubtedly prefer to see her remain in confinement. Since the next general election is set for May 2010, it is vaguely possible that she might be released as early as January 2009, though only after a consistent stream of other hostages have been released beforehand. On the other hand, it is more likely she would be retained so as to be the very last pawn, as unfortunate as that may be. After all, there are other significant leftist players in Colombia.
The overall hostage release strategy has been inconvenienced by the U.S./Colombian campaign to paint Chavez as a terrorist collaborator, though it is difficult to see how its eventual reinstatement can realistically be prevented. After all, Venezuela merely plays a detached role. It has been interesting to note that in quick succession, a fleet of U.S. warships has resumed patrols in the region, Colombian paramilitaries have crossed onto Venezuela territory, and a U.S. military plane flew directly through Venezuelan airspace “by accident”. It appears that warning signals are afoot, though the exact nature of the threat is uncertain.
The message, however, is crystal clear: don’t re-engage with the FARC. Does Chavez believe it might compromise the crucial gubernatorial elections this November, or even assist in securing key gubernatorial positions along the Colombian border? The ultimate decision may rest on time constraints and the medium-term strategy of the hostage release program, if they exist. The other obvious question is whether the U.S. and Colombia are as toothless as they appear at face value, and whether Chavez’s potential inclusion on a “terror list” will affect their capacity to subvert and destabilize Venezuela.
The U.S. already has a Miami court case (regarding the famous $800,000 suitcase) timed to cause maximum damage before November. Besides, the assortment of alleged FARC documents will no doubt emerge in a piecemeal fashion to weaken Chavez’s international image at the most useful moments. However, as well as holding the ultimate deterrent in the form of a potential oil shut-off, Chavez also has a more plausible power to limit the heavy flow of imports from Colombia to the extent he desires. Certainly, there are many economic interests that would have a word in Uribe’s ear before he did anything stupid.
Should Barack Obama win the U.S. presidency, Chavez’s designation on the “terror list” appears set to occur before he takes office. This would serve as an excuse for Obama to reject Chavez’s offer of dialogue, or alternatively a barrier preventing him from accepting it, depending on whether his campaign talk is just hot air or not. It would be futile to designate Chavez before Venezuela’s November elections, since one can guarantee he would speak of little else in his nationwide campaigning for his socialist candidates.
One has to remember that Uribe is simply the frontman for a wider establishment, and the hostage release strategy is similarly broad. It may be unlikely that significant political change could occur in Colombia by 2010, given Uribe’s popularity and the fact that he might still seek to run for a third term. However, other things are certain: as more hostages are released and Colombian politics remain unchanged, the country will become more isolated and the leading politicians more out of touch with reality. Given the increasing momentum of leftism and independence in the region, such an outcome will reach a critical point, and one hopes that Colombians will soon realise what the majority of Latin America already knows: Uribe’s ilk promise eventual peace and social justice, but have no intention of delivering either.
“Based on the success of the recently-suspended hostage release program, it’s practically certain that both sides have agreed on a long-term strategy that will reduce militarism and gradually decrease the net number of hostages in the FARC’s possession.”
Success of the hostage release program ? Yeah, Carlos, therefore the FARC kidnapped a group of Norwegian tourists *immediatly* after the release of a few hostages of limited values. We know. Your words may sound sweet, but the deeds reveail your lies.
Aside that, how much Chavez really cares about FARC hostages has been proven by his behaviour towards Venezuelan victims of the FARC. Not only that he denied their existence, when their families – in their utter despair plaeded to the only who listened to them (Uribe) Chavez threatened to have them tried as traitors. The hostage release is a PR action for Chavez nothing else. If he would really care, he would also care for the Venezuelan. He does NOT.
“The hostage releases are a masterpiece in “asymmetric warfare” against the Colombian state and the U.S., because they involve zero violence and zero invasion of Colombian sovereignty.”
In other words, it is not only ok for you that children are killed to prevent people from leaving a Gulag, now you misuse victims.
FARC NO MAS !! CHAVEST NO MAS !!! CASTRO NO MAS !! FASCISMO NO MAS !!!
People like that are simply disgusting.
Alvaro Uribe is the leader with the most domestic support in Latin America- 84%. Colombians hate Chavez with a passion. Chavez is likely second most-popular. I feel like Chavez’ best intentions backfired on his popularity in Colombia but boost it in Venezuela. I don’t like Uribe’s politics but Colombia is very far from ever liking Chavez.
The suitcase had $800,000. Also I wrote the previous comment. Also “maintaining a minimum level of military action” is not convincing any Colombians that they should elect a Chavista- precisely the opposite.
Colombians have have their experiences with the FARC. During Pastrana the FARC practically had their own state. Peace negotiations grew very far, until the FARC launched one of the biggest military offensives in Colombian history, proving that they misused their territorry to regroup, strengthen their forces and try to overthrow a democratically elected government.
Colombians have learned their lesson. They just want peace, no FARC and no Chavez.
Aside that, the “care” of Chavez for hostages (or better the non-care) was shown when the FARC kidnapped 6 Norwegian Tourists imediatly after the hostage release. Did he call them to refrain from kidnapping ? NO. Parts of the Chavista movement *encouraged them* to continue.
However, particularly disgusting is that Chavez does exactly what he accuses the US of doing: Meddling into the affairs of other countries and trying to overthrow democratically elected governments that have a far broader democratic legitimation than Chavez ever had.
It is no wonder. Chavez and Chavistas care for democracy and human rights only if it is for themselves.
Corrected.
I don’t say Colombia might elect a ‘Chavista’, but an independent or anti-imperialist is hardly out of the question, some years down the line. You seem to be forgetting that poor people are not as big a voting block as they should be, most didn’t vote for Uribe (or wouldn’t have if given a better choice), and don’t take part in these surveys.
Maintaining *reduced* military activity, ie. less aggression and more defence, will be seen favourably compared to previous levels. That in itself won’t convince anybody to vote out the hawks, but would be an encouraging gesture.
It will be a slow process, but you can’t deny Uribe’s desperate measures to put brakes on it. That in itself should tell you a lot.
“most didn’t vote for Uribe (or wouldn’t have if given a better choice), and don’t take part in these surveys.”
Yeah Carlos. I guess you should read the statistics. They belie your claim. Dream on. Colombians just want peace, nothing else.
Carlos, arounf 28 Mio Colombians are eligible to vote. 26.7 Mio are registered. Where is your big block of poor people who can not vote ? I do not see it.
Yes Tom, democracy is flourishing in Colombia:
As many voted for Uribe in 2006 (7.3m) as did for Chavez in 2006, despite Colombia’s population being over 50% larger (43m versus 27m in 2006).
“According to the latest figures from Colombia’s electoral authorities, turnout [in 2006] was a dismal 43 percent of eligible voters.”
Compare that to 75% turnout in Venezuela.
“Here, the people don’t vote,” Roberto Camacho, one of the millions of people living in the slums and shantytowns around the outskirts of Bogotá, told me in his living room on election day. “The president is only for the rich. The candidates talk of the poor in their campaigns, but once they get into office they forget all about us.”
No wonder you didn’t bring any statistics to the party, Tom.
Carlos, if you do not vote in a democracy, you have to live with the results. This is called *democracy*. Oh, I forgot. You are admiring somebody who calls a democratic outcome “victory of the shit” and thinks a one party dictatorship is democratic.
Aside that, Carlos: Once again for you: Chavez does exactly the same as he accuses the US of doing. Overthrowing a democratically elected government by means of terrorists. Alone by this act he lost *all* democratic legitimation.
Colombians love Uribe. Obviously if someone they loved more was on the ballot they might vote for him, but Uribismo isn’t going anywhere soon.
Vincent, why do Colombians love Uribe ? He has stabilized the country, most paramilitaries are demobilized, the FARC is in retreat economy doing better. Compare that to Venezuela. In living in Caracas is soon more dangerous than living in Bogota or Bagdad with crime rates exploding.
“if someone they loved more was on the ballot”
If only.
Carlos, it tells volumes that you do not address the main pints:
1) Why does Chavez support a trroristic group that wants to overthrow a democratically elected government ?
2) If your propaganda about reduction of hostages would be true, why does the FARC continue to kidnap, even *immediately* after a histage release ?
3) If your propaganda about Chavez caring for the hostages would be true, why does he not care one little bit about Venezuelan hostages ?
it’s not that difficult to comprehend, tom:
1- Chavez realises they will never overthrow the colombian government by force, and has persuaded them to try a new strategy. You should be happy about this.
2- In the early stages of this new strategy, the FARC did kidnap others, but we have no idea if that was sanctioned by the leadership, or if it was a special exception. We will have to wait and see.
3- Obviously, the FARC do not bend over backwards for Chavez. They release hostages based on expected gains for them within Colombia, not gains for Chavez in Venezuela.
Point 1: If he persuaded them of a new strategy, why did the FARC apparently lie to Chavez and why did the kidnap Norwegian tourists right after the release of the hostages ?
Point 2: The FARC continues to kidnap, and this *is* a strategy of the leadership.
Point 3: Carlos, do not try to lie a smokescreen: Chavez denies there are *any* Venezuelan hostages despite conclusive proof that there are. When the families complain about this, they are threatened to be tried in a criminal court as traitors. Explain this. This behaviour by Chavez is incompatible with compassion for hostages. Explain this.
1- When you have 10-15k rebels, it is possible that a kidnapping took place against orders. Maybe the new policy is to make fewer kidnappings and be more selective. We will have to wait and see, guessing will get us nowhere.
2- We will have to wait and see, guessing will get us nowhere.
3- I have no idea why Chavez would want to lie about whether the FARC have Venezuelans. If they do, and won’t release them, it’s not Chavez’s fault.
1.) four of the victims where released after considerable international pressure, two are *still* held hostage. This is absolutely incompatible with a strategy of less kidnappings. he acts of FARC belie you.
2) The FARC still kidnaps, this is no “guessing”. These kidnappings belie your theory about less militarism and less kidnappings. They keep low profile because they are with the back to the wall, and not because they want peace.
3) You still do not get it. Chavez denied not only help to the families of Venezuelans in the hands of the FARC, he threatened to have them tried in criminal court. This is conclisive evidence he does not are about the victims, only about the PR.
Carlos, you can say whatever you want. The acts of the FARC as wel as Chavez’ acts belie your little theory.
Do you know why many victims are kidnapped ? To use their bank accounts as money laundery. The FARC has no incentive to release them. It would be damaging for their drug dealing business.
Carlos, to demonstrate what bullshit you are posting here, lets quote BBC:
“The ruling body of the Farc, the Secretariat, announced at the end of last year that 2008 would see an upsurge in guerrilla operations.”
Carlos, what you post is at best ignorance, at worst lies.