vencentral.com                                      Venezuelan Politics Chavez Oil Bolivarian Revolution News Views Analysis

You may have already read in the sidebar that 863 workers in the Mitsubishi plant in Anzoategui state voted to occupy the factory premises and reinstate 135 subcontractors that had recently been laid off. It was an overwhelming vote in solidarity with the subcontractors, in which only 25 voted against the occupation, or abstained.

From Marxist.com:

In the afternoon of Wednesday, January 29 (Venezuelan time), two workers were killed by police in the state of Anzoategui, Venezuela. The workers killed are Pedro Suarez from the Mitsubishi factory and José Marcano from nearby auto parts factory Macusa. They were killed when regional police of Anzoategui was attempting to evict hundreds of workers who had been occupying the Mitsubitshi (MMC) factory.

As well as demanding the reincorporation of the 135 as full contracted workers in the Mitsubishi plant, the employees were also overwhelmingly supporters of the revolutionary process in Venezuela, and had identified their actions with the wider (yet still young) struggle against private ownership of production. Many of them have pledged themselves as active campaigners for the constitutional amendment vote on February 15th.

So, when a judge decreed that the workers be immediately evicted from the Mitsubishi plant, and police forces arrived fully armed and ready for a fight, the workers were not about to roll over. They had received comprehensive support from others in already-occupied factories, as well as those in Ford and Toyota plants who are currently considering similar actions.

These deaths, combined with the numerous other wounded, illustrate that despite revolutionary governorship in Anzoategui state (Tarek William Saab), many regional police are still detached from popular sentiment and a law unto themselves. They were prevented from causing even more injury and deaths by the National Guard. The judge, while in all probability not sympathetic to the workers’ cause, was likely following the letter of the law. Clearly, there is something wrong with a law that prevents the will of such a majority overcoming the rights of an exploitative and extremely slim minority.

Equally, there is something gravely wrong with a police force that can bring arms to bear against an unarmed crowd, let alone such a clear example of democracy. We can hope for successful convictions, but the long-term solution is a truly popular police force, which identifies with citizen rights just as the armed forces have been encouraged to do since the arrival of Chavez in the presidency.

Changing the law to permit (and thereby encourage) such actions on a national scale is an eventual necessity, though today it may well result in the emergence of mercenary forces and greater loss of life. The only option for now appears to be a gradual advance of revolutionary influence, not only on the legal system, but also in terms of policing, PSUV communications, and the tactics of workers themselves.

The opposition are right about one thing: if Chavez’s goal was to become a dictator, it would be necessary to remove term limits. But supporters of the revolution are equally right on another point: if Chavez’s goal is indeed to transform Venezuela into a world power, and construct the purest form of democracy ever seen, it makes sense that continuity of good government be prioritised.

Today, after barely five years of concerted government spending, many of the least privileged Venezuelans readily claim that levels of confidence, health and education are rising. These are three of the most important factors which determine how difficult a population is to govern; how demanding they are, and how likely they are to vote.

If people are organizing themselves, being included in decision-making, having their voices heard, learning, increasing in consciousness and being relieved of general worries such as bad health and debt, it is highly probable that the elimination of presidential and other term limits would be beneficial. It would increase the likelihood of these trends becoming more engrained, and developing more rapidly.

In such a climate, it is more imperative than ever that good governance (i.e. the leadership most responsible for such trends) is rewarded, and thereby permitted to continue pursuing long-term objectives. A change of leadership at a time when things are progressing as well as can be imagined is more likely to hamper progress than improve it. As we know, leaders have varying ideas, visions and priorities. The general feeling among Chavistas today is: why fix it if it ain’t broke?

Of course, the opposition have a rather different perspective. They seem to see things progressing as badly as could possibly be imagined. They would argue that any growing confidence of the poor is a false confidence, that health and financial worries have been replaced (if at all) with the fear of crime, that their education contains a strong element of propaganda, that their newfound decision-making only exists in a narrow and illusory context, and that their voices are only heard if they conform to the party line.

While you can endlessly twist and select facts to portray the Venezuelan revolution in such a fashion, the important point is that those who see this contorted picture are invariably not the ones who needed confidence, healthcare, or education in the first place, and so have been out of the loop throughout these last years! With little or no experience whatsoever of social programs, healthcare services, communal councils or grassroots media, they are attempting to speak on behalf of (and directly contradicting most of!) all those who in fact possess all the relevant experience!

If the constitutional amendment is likely to benefit a sector who already claim they are benefitting from revolutionary policies, and is simultaneously opposed by another sector who are effectively detached from the entire experience, it is only fair to give the benefit of the doubt to those with the authority on the matter.

It would be ridiculous to oppose eliminating term limits if you were in a minority of one (i.e. if there was 99.9% national consensus). That would be an outright repudiation of democracy itself, in addition to a repudiation of additional democratic rights.

The novel aspect of this upcoming referendum is its dual-democratic aspect: a free & fair vote on a question of expanding voting rights. The prospect of 51% of the electorate being able to deny everybody (but particularly the other 49%) such additional rights, based on their majority alone, appears to border on the absurd.

It would be far less absurd if it was 90% of the electorate denying the other 10%. After all, both arguments have merit, even the prima facie anti-democratic one. There is no question that the legitimacy of the eventual democratic result, whichever way it goes, is very much dependent on the size of the majority behind it.

But which would be more legitimate in the moral sense: 51% of voters denying the right to all, or 51% of voters “forcing” the right upon all?

I’d argue the balance is firmly tipped towards the latter. After all, if a minority is against being granted a certain right, they can thereafter freely choose not to exercise it. For a minority (of equal proportion, for the sake of argument) to be denied such a right by a majority who happen to oppose it on principle, would undoubtedly be less fair.

The case in Venezuela today is that the opposition are not even so much against the amendment in principle as they are against it in their particular circumstances! In fact, they see Chavez’s popularity as so disadvantageous that one can assume (with great confidence) their principled arguments are mostly — if not entirely — opportunistic.

Who would bet against them turning around and exercising this right were the circumstances ever in their favour? Not me, that’s for sure.